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Abstract
This paper constructs a dynamic equilibrium growth model, in which some rms
act as monopsonies on the labor market. The framework is an OLG growth model
with altruistic agents. Two types of rms exist, competitive and non-competitive,
the latter being endowed with a more productive technology. They behave strate-
gically on the labor market, in taking into account the impact of their demand for
labor on the equilibrium wage and on their prot. In this framework, the impact of
a technical progress on capital accumulation can be positive or negative, depending
on its e¤ect on monopsony power.
JEL classication: D43, D9, O3
Keywords: imperfect competition, capital accumulation, technical progress.
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1 Introduction
This paper constructs a dynamic equilibrium growth model, in which some rms act
as monopsonies on the labor market. Bhaskar, Manning and To (2002) give many
arguments in favor of the assumption of oligopsony competition in labor market.
They review the main theoretical arguments that all use static frameworks. Intro-
ducing monopsony power in a dynamic growth model allows to study its impact
on capital accumulation, and to reveal paradoxical e¤ects: for instance, a technical
progress may decrease capital accumulation if it leads to distortions due to imperfect
competition.
We consider an economy populated by rms that di¤er by their productivity.
Firms with the lowest productivity are competitive as their technology is freely
available. A few number of rms hold an exclusive technology with a higher pro-
ductivity, and have a non-competitive behavior. Indeed, if all rms behaved com-
petitively, only the rm endowed with the most productive technology would be
active in equilibrium. But the assumption of perfect competition would become
meaningless with only one rm on the market.
The most productive rms realize that they hold some market power on the
labor market, and take into account the impact of their demand for labor on wages.
We thus obtain an equilibrium with strategic (oligopsonic) behaviors in the labor
market. This type of behavior tends to reduce the equilibrium wage and to increase
the gross interest rate. In a growth model, capital accumulation depends on savings
rates on capital income and wage income. The non-competitive behavior of rms
will then imply a change in capital accumulation that will depend on these two
savings rates.
In this framework is studied the impact on capital accumulation of a technical
progress. In a competitive economy, this impact is always positive. In a non-
competitive model, the impact can be positive or negative, depending on its e¤ect
on monopsony power. Taking as xed all productivities, we study in details the im-
pact of a technical progress that benets to a non-competitive rm and a technical
progress a¤ecting the competitive sector. Finally, in a last part a simple example is
studied in which productivities may vary across time through innovations. At each
period, one rm may benet from a random innovation that increases its productiv-
ity by some given factor. The innovator has an exclusive use of its technology during
one period, but it becomes freely available after. In this context, the occurrence of
an innovation can have a negative short run impact on the growth rate, because
imperfect competition decreases the equilibrium wage. But, after one period, the
e¤ect is positive as the technology is available for the competitive sector.
Little work has been done that introduces monopsony into a dynamic general
equilibrium models, in spite of the importance of monopsony in the labor market.
On the other hand, some authors have focused on non-competitive behaviors on the
capital market in dynamic general equilibrium models, mainly Sorger (2002) and
Becker (2003). In these models, rms are perfectly competitive and consumers be-
have non-competitively in the capital market. A long run equilibrium exists in which
consumers endowed with di¤erent rates of time preference hold positive amounts of
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capital.
The imperfect competition mechanism that we introduce in this paper can also
be viewed in the line of Cournot-Walras equilibrium (Gabszewicz and Vial 1972;
Codognato and Gabszewicz 1993). Recent papers have used this concept in various
frameworks. Belan, Michel and Wigniolle (2002) show that it can be fruitful to
interpret pension funds behavior. Belan, Michel and Wigniolle (2005) wonder if
imperfect competition can foster capital accumulation in a developing economy.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the game played by non-
competitive rms. Section 3 studies householdsbehavior. Section 4 presents the
intertemporal long run equilibrium. Section 5 analyses the impact of an exogenous
technical change on capital accumulation. Section 6 concludes. The most complex
proofs are available in the appendix of the working paper (dOnofrio and Wigniolle
2006), and also upon request.
2 The productive sector
First we dene the equilibrium concept. Second, the existence of an equilibrium is
proved. Third, the impact of imperfect competition on equilibrium prices is studied.
2.1 Denition of the equilibrium concept
We consider an imperfect competition concept in the line of the Cournot-Walras
equilibrium. At each period t occurs a game consisting of three steps. In a rst step,
households allocate their savings between the di¤erent rms, arbitrating between the
di¤erent capital returns. At the second step, the non-competitive rms choose their
labor demand (their strategic variable). In the third step, an equilibrium occurs on
the labor market that determines the equilibrium wage.
We now make precise the assumptions regarding the productive sector.
Firms employ capital and labor. Capital depreciates fully in one period. There
exist two types of rms: competitive and non-competitive. Competitive rms have
the same Cobb-Douglas technology given by:
F (K0;t; L0;t) = A0K

0;tL
1 
0;t :
Without loss of generality, it is possible to consider only one competitive rm, and
we denote by K0;t and L0;t its amounts of capital and labor.
There exist m non-competitive rms respectively endowed with Cobb-Douglas
production technologies given by:
for i = 1; :::m; AiKi;tL
1 
i;t :
We assume the following inequalities: A0 < A1 < ::::: < Am: The lowest productivity
corresponds to a basic technology which is freely available, and rms using this
technology have a competitive behavior as they are numerous1. A few number of
1As usual, we ctitiously consider one rm in the competitive sector as the aggregate equilibrium
of the competitive sector is independent of the number of rms.
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rms benet from a higher productivity that may result from a past innovation. As
each of them has an exclusive use of its own technology, it is natural to assume that
they have non-competitive behaviors. We will assume along the rst part of the
paper that this production structure is identical at all periods.
At the beginning of period t; the total amount of capital Kt is allocated by
households among the di¤erent rms. This capital stock results from period t   1
savings behavior and for the moment, Kt is assumed to be given2. In period t;
the households who hold the capital stock of rm i (0  i  m) share the prot
according to their capital contribution. The resulting payo¤ per unit of capital for
them is:
Ri;t =
AiK

i;tL
1 
i;t   wtLi;t
Ki;t
: (1)
We assume that households are atomistic and behave competitively. They take Ri;t
as given and invest their savings in rms providing the highest returns Ri;t:
Using these assumptions, the three steps of the game are the following.
1. At the beginning of period t; consumers allocate their savings Kt among the
di¤erent rms i; 0  i  m : Kt = K0;t +
mX
i=1
Ki;t:
2. Their capital stock being installed, the m non-competitive rms choose their
labor demand (L1;t; ::Li;t; :::Lm;t) ; such that
mX
i=1
Li;t  Nt: (2)
3. There is an equilibrium on the labor market. This equilibrium is reached when
the competitive labor demand of rm 0 is equal to the remaining quantity of
labor after the decision of non-competitive rms, or
wt = A0(1  )K0;t
 
Nt  
mX
i=1
Li;t
! 
:
As it is usual in Cournot-Walras competition, the strategies of non-competitive
rms are constrained by (2) in such a way that an equilibrium exists. By assumption,
rms i = 1; :::;m are the only strategic agents. Firm 0 and consumers behave
competitively.
The game is solved by backward induction.
From step 3, the equilibrium condition on the labor market denes the equi-
librium wage as a function of the demands of labor by non-competitive rms Li;t,
i = 1; :::;m:
wt = A0(1  )K0;t
 
Nt  
mX
i=1
Li;t
! 
 !t (L1;t; :::; Lm;t) : (3)
2Householdssavings behavior is described in section 3.
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From step 2, each non-competitive rm imaximizes its prot, taking into account
the impact of its labor demand on the equilibrium wage:
max
Li;t
AiK

i;tL
1 
i;t   !t (L1;t; :::; Lm;t)Li;t (4)
The optimal choice of Li;t is such that3:
(1  )AiKi;tL i;t   (1  )A0K0;tL 0;t   (1  )A0K0;tLi;tL  10;t = 0: (5)
The third term of this equation stems from the non-competitive behavior.
Finally, from step 1, all capital returns must be equal:
8i = 1; :::;m; AiK

i;tL
1 
i;t   wtLi;t
Ki;t
=
A0K

0;tL
1 
0;t   wtL0;t
K0;t
= A0K
 1
0;t L
1 
0;t : (6)
and the total capital stock is shared between all rms:
K0;t +
mX
i=1
Ki;t = Kt: (7)
In order to characterize the equilibrium of the game, it is convenient to introduce
the following notations: qi = Ai=A0; li;t = Li;t=Ki;t; i;t = li;t=l0;t; pi;t = Ki;t=Kt and
~pi;t = pi;t=p0;t:
Equation (5) can be written:
Ail
 
i;t   A0l 0;t   A0
Ki;t
K0;t
li;tl
  1
0;t = 0:
Dividing by A0l 0;t we obtain:
qi
 
i;t   1  ~pi;ti;t = 0: (8)
The equality of capital returns for each rm (6) denes the gross return on
savings Rt:
Rt  A0l1 0;t = Ail1 i;t   A0(1  )l 0;t li;t: (9)
Dividing by A0l 0;t we obtain the equation:
qi
1 
i;t   (1  )i;t = : (10)
Finally, the allocation of total capital on the di¤erent rms (7) leads to:
p0;t
 
1 +
mX
i=1
~pi;t
!
= 1: (11)
Equations (8), (10) and (11) allow to characterize the equilibrium of the game.
3The concavity of the prot function with respect to Li;t is satised, as the second derivative is
 (1  )AiKi;tL  1i;t   2(1  )A0K0;tL  10;t   (1  )(1 + )A0K0;tLi;tL  20;t < 0:
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2.2 Existence of the equilibrium between non-competitive
rms
In this section, we prove that our equilibrium concept leads to a unique equilibrium,
and we describe its properties. We rst remark that (8), (10) and (11) dene a
system of 2m + 1 equations for 2m + 1 variables, and that these equations do not
depend on the period t: Consequently, 8i = 1; :::;m; i;t; ~pi;t and p0;t are constant
variables, that we will write further i; ~pi and p0:
From equation (8), we obtain that i is such that: qi
 
i > 1; or i < (qi)
1= :
Equation (10) has a unique solution i such that i < (qi)
1= ; and this solution
denes i as a decreasing function of qi: Moreover, as qi
 
i > 1; (10) implies that:
i   (1  )i    < iqi i   (1  )i    = 0:
Thus, i < 1: We have nally proved that all non-competitive rms have a smaller
labor-capital ratio than the ratio in the competitive sector. The more productive a
non-competitive rm is, the smaller its labor-capital ratio is, as i is a decreasing
function of qi. This property results from the higher market power of the more pro-
ductive rms: they reduce their labor demand in order to decrease the equilibrium
wage.
As for all i = 1; :::;m; i is well-dened, we deduce from (8) the value of ~pi;
8i = 1; :::;m :
~pi =
qi
 
i   1
i
which is an increasing function of qi:
Finally p0 is given by (11), and is a decreasing function of qi: The share of capital
held by rm i pi is given by:
pi = p0~pi =
~pi
1 +
mX
j=1
~pj
which is an increasing function of ~pi; and therefore an increasing function of qi:
We have nally proved that, for each value of total capital, there exists a non-
competitive equilibrium in which all rms are productive. The higher the productiv-
ity of a rm is, the higher the share of capital that it employs at equilibrium is and
the lower its labor-capital ratio will be. It is worth noting that, in an equilibrium
with perfect competition, only the most productive rm would be active. With im-
perfect competition, the more productive rms strategically diminishes their labor
demand to decrease the equilibrium wage. This behavior exerts a positive external-
ity on less productive rms, which employ a higher labor-capital ratio, and which
can attain the same level of capital productivity.
2.3 Equilibrium prices
At period t; Kt being the total capital stock and Nt the number of young people, it
is possible to determine the equilibrium level of the wage wt and the gross interest
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rate Rt:
From the labor market equilibrium, we have:
Nt =
mX
i=0
Li;t =
mX
i=0
li;tpiKt
Nt = l0;tp0Kt
"
1 +
mX
i=1
i~pi
#
Finally, with kt = Kt=Nt denoting the ratio of capital per young agent, we obtain
from (11):
l 10;t = ktX
with X =
1 +
Pm
i=1 i~pi
1 +
Pm
i=1 ~pi
In an economy with perfect competition, we would obtain X = 1: In our economy
with imperfect competition, we have X < 1 as i < 1: For the competitive rm, the
equilibrium labor-capital ratio l0;t is higher than its value for a perfectly competitive
economy 1=kt:
We can then deduce the values of the equilibrium wage (3) and gross interest
rate (9):
wt = (1  )A0l 0;t = (1  )A0kt X; (12)
Rt = A0l
1 
0;t = A0k
 1
t X
 1: (13)
In these two equations, the variable X results from imperfect competition. As
X < 1; we see that imperfect competition tends to decrease the equilibrium wage,
and to increase the gross interest rate, with respect to the case of perfect competition
with the less productive technology.
3 Householdsbehavior
The production sector is part of a standard overlapping generations model with
altruistic agents, based on Diamond (1965) and Barro (1974)-Weil (1987). Agents
are living for two periods. The size of generation t is Nt and each agent has (1 + n)
children. Parents care about their childrens welfare. The utility of a generation t
agent, Vt, is given by
Vt = U(ct; dt+1) + Vt+1; 0 <  < 1
with U(ct; dt+1) = (1  a) ln(ct) + a ln(dt+1)
ct and dt+1 respectively denote rst period and second period consumptions. In their
rst period of life, individuals born in t work and receive a wage wt. In addition to
their wage income, they receive a bequest xt from their parents. They consume ct
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and save an amount st: Gross returns on savings are equal to Rt+1 : at equilibrium,
all rms provide the same return on capital. In their second period of life, people
receive returns on savings and allocate net resources between consumption dt+1 and
bequests xt+1 to their (1 + n) children. Thus
xt + wt = ct + st; (14)
Rt+1st = dt+1 + (1 + n)xt+1: (15)
Bequests must be non-negative :
xt+1  0: (16)
Maximizing the utility Vt under the constraints (14), (15) and (16) leads to the
standard rst-order conditions
U
0
c(ct; dt+1) = Rt+1U
0
d(ct; dt+1); (17)
 (1 + n)U 0d(ct; dt+1) + U
0
c(ct+1; dt+2)  0: (18)
The second condition holds with equality if xt+1 > 0.
When bequests are constrained at all periods (8t; xt = 0), equation (17) with a
log-linear utility function leads to the simple saving function:
st = awt: (19)
In the long run, the economy reaches a steady state that is called egoistic long run
equilibrium.
When bequests are positive, it is well known that the economy converges towards
the modied golden rule steady state:
R =
1 + n

: (20)
We call altruistic long run equilibrium this steady state.
Using a logarithmic instantaneous utility function, capital accumulation only
depends on the equilibrium wage in an egoistic steady state, and on the gross return
of capital in an altruistic steady state.
4 The intertemporal long run equilibrium
Two types of long run intertemporal equilibria may exist: an altruistic equilibrium
with operative bequest (x > 0) and an egoistic equilibrium (x = 0).
At an altruistic long run equilibrium, the capital per young agent ratio kt con-
verges towards a value k; which is determined by (13) and by the modied golden
rule (20): R = A0k 1X 1 = (1 + n)=; or:
k =


1 + n
 1
1  (A0)
1
1 
X
: (21)
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Along an egoistic long run equilibrium, the capital per young agent ratio kt
converges toward a value k; which is determined by (12) and by the savings behavior
of the agents (19): (1 + n)k = aw; or:
k =

(1  )a
1 + n
 1
1 
(A0)
1
1  (X)

1  : (22)
In both equations (21) and (22) the impact of imperfect competition on capital
accumulation results from the variable X < 1: Within an altruistic steady state,
capital accumulation in the long run only depends on the return of capital. As
imperfect competition tends to increase the gross interest rate, the capital per young
agent ratio k is higher than under perfect competition. In contrast, within an egoistic
steady state, capital accumulation in the long run only depends on savings that only
depend on the equilibrium wage for a log-linear utility function. Thus, as imperfect
competition tends to decrease the equilibrium wage, the capital per young agent
ratio k is smaller than under perfect competition.
The condition ensuring positive bequests in Weil (1987) remains the same in our
framework. The steady state will be altruistic if k > k; or (1 )aX < : As X is
smaller than 1; this condition shows that the existence of an altruistic steady state
is furthered by imperfect competition. This property was expected as imperfect
competition tends to increase the return to capital .
5 Technical progress and capital accumulation
5.1 Increasing productivity of a non-competitive rm
We rst study the impact of an increase of some Ai; i  1: This is equivalent to
consider that some qi increases, for i  1: Such technical progress will a¤ect capital
accumulation through the variable X: It is worth noting that X has an opposite
e¤ect on the two types of steady states, altruistic or egoistic. An increase of X
diminishes k and rises k: As a benchmark, we know that a technical progress in a
competitive economy always increases capital accumulation, in both types of long
run equilibria.
Proposition 1 it is possible to dene some increasing function (q) with (1) = 0;
such that, for each qi; i = 1; ::::;m; the interval Ki = (1; qi + (qi)) satises:
1. If for all j 6= i; qj 2 Ki; @X@qi < 0: An increase of qi rises k and diminishes k:
2. If for all j 6= i; qj =2 Ki; @X@qi > 0: An increase of qi diminishes k and raises k:
Corollary 1 1. For i = m; as all qj 2 Km; we have @X@qm < 0: An increase of qm
raises k and diminishes k:
2. q1 is the only variable that can satisfy point 2 of proposition (1). Particularly,
if q1 is su¢ ciently small, (q1 tends toward 1), @X@q1 > 0: An increase of q1
diminishes k and raises k:
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These results show that a technical progress can have various e¤ects on capital
accumulation. The rst case is obtained when all rms j have a productivity pa-
rameter qj close to qi (close in the sense that qj 2 (1; qi + (qi))). The second case
is obtained when q1 is su¢ ciently small with respect to q2; q3; :::qm: Therefore, the
impact of a technical progress on capital accumulation depends on two components:
on the initial productivity of the rm experiencing a technical progress with respect
to other rms, and on the type of long-run equilibrium - egoistic or altruistic.
This latter component can be understood, having in mind that the rise of pro-
ductivity of a non-competitive rm has opposite e¤ects on factors remuneration at
equilibrium: if the equilibrium wage increases, the rate of return decreases and vice
versa. Therefore, if capital accumulation increases for an egoistic steady state, it
will decrease for an altruistic one and conversely.
The former component can be explained, as an increase of one rms productivity
leads to two opposite e¤ects. First, the rm reduces the quantity of labor used per
unit of capital. This e¤ect tends to decrease the equilibrium value of the wage
and to increase the capital return. Second, since all capital returns are equal at
equilibrium, the rm holds a higher share of the total capital of the economy. If the
rm that benets from this productivity increase is the most productive (i = m), this
second e¤ect acts in the same sense as the rst one. Therefore, the equilibrium wage
decreases and the capital return increases. But, if the rm that benets from this
productivity increase is not the most productive one (i < m), the second e¤ect acts
in opposite direction to the rst one, and the global e¤ect is ambiguous. Particularly,
it is proved that for the less productive non-competitive rm, it is possible that a rise
in its productivity increases the equilibrium wage and decreases the capital return.
5.2 Increasing productivity in the competitive sector
We study the impact of an increase of A0 on both types of stationary equilibrium
k and k: From (21) and (22), A0 has a direct e¤ect and an indirect e¤ect via the
variable X: Indeed, increasing A0 implies a decrease for all qi, i  1:
The following proposition shows that an increase of A0 can have various e¤ects
on capital accumulation.
Proposition 2 1. When qm ! +1; d ln kdA0 ! 1A0(1 ) and d ln
k
dA0
! 0:
2. When q1 ! 1; d ln kdA0 !  1 and d ln
k
dA0
! +1:
3. When 8i  1; qi = q, d ln kdA0 > 0 and d ln
k
dA0
< 0: By continuity, these properties
hold when the qi; i  1; are su¢ ciently close together.
These results show that when the total factor productivities of non-competitive
rms are close, an increase of A0 tends to increase capital accumulation in an egoistic
steady state, and to decrease capital accumulation in an altruistic steady state. This
e¤ect results from the increase of the wage and the decrease of the capital return.
In contrast, the results may be reversed when the total factor productivities of non-
competitive rms are distant.
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The direct e¤ect of an increase of the productivity in the non-competitive sec-
tor is a rise of both wage and capital returns. But an indirect e¤ect stems from
the fall of the relative productivity of all non-competitive rms, which modify their
market power. If non-competitive rms have close productivities (case 3), the pro-
ductivity increase in the competitive sector implies a fall in the market power of all
non-competitive rms, which causes an increase of wages and a decrease of capital
returns. If non-competitive rms have distant productivities (cases 1 and 2), the
productivity increase in the competitive sector redistributes market power in favor
of the most productive rms, and to the detriment of the less productive ones. The
resulting e¤ect on capital accumulation may be reversed with respect to case 3.
5.3 Growth with random innovations
In this last section, we provide a simple extension of the model, introducing random
innovations. We assume that at each period, with a probability ; one rm receives
an innovation (and with probability 1  ; no innovation occurs in the whole econ-
omy). This innovation increases the productivity by a factor  > 1; with respect
to the common technology. Finally, each innovator has an exclusive use of its new
technology during only one period. After that period, there is free access to this
technology.
From the preceding assumptions, at each period t; either the economy is purely
competitive and the common productivity is A0;t; or one non-competitive rm has
a productivity level A1;t = A0;t while the other rms are competitive with the
common productivity A0;t:
We only consider the egoistic equilibrium in this part, as we want to analyze the
dynamics of capital accumulation. The dynamics of kt with random innovations can
be written:
(1 + n)kt+1 = a(1  )A0;tkt Xt :
With probability  (arrival of an innovation in t):
Xt =
x
1 + x(x  1)
with x > 1 the solution of  = x1  + (1  )x 
A0;t+1 = A0;t
With probability 1   (no innovation in t):
Xt = 1
A0;t+1 = A0;t
As x > 1; we have x
1+x(x 1) < 1: The arrival of an innovation has a negative
short run e¤ect on the growth rate, because imperfect competition decreases the
equilibrium wage. But, after one period, the e¤ect is positive as the technology is
available for the competitive sector. The greater the size of the innovation  is, the
larger both short run and long run e¤ects will be.
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This simple example shows that a technical progress can have two paradoxical
e¤ects in the short run: rst, it can cause a fall in capital accumulation; second,
it can increase the share of GDP devoted to capital income and decrease the share
devoted to labor income. These two e¤ects result from the non-competitive behavior
of innovating rms.
6 Conclusion
This paper has studied how long run growth can be a¤ected by strategic behavior of
rms in the labor market. The main results show the paradoxical e¤ects associated
with imperfect competition: a technical progress may decrease capital accumulation
if it leads to distortions due to imperfect competition.
Our work could lead to further developments, mostly in endogenizing the techni-
cal progress by an explicit innovative activity of the rms. Growth models in which
innovation is the source of growth are natural frameworks to develop our analysis,
since they make endogenous productivity di¤erences of rms.
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